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ABSTRACT:  This study is dedicated 
to an important aspect of the long-run 
performance of firms, namely their survival 
under rapidly changing conditions in a 
transition economy. The analysis is focused 
on the question of whether privatization 
and ownership structure have affected the 
likelihood of liquidation and bankruptcy 
of firms in Russia. We use a sample of 
497 privatized and non-privatized firms 
that were surveyed in 1999-2000, and for 
which information was collected about 
their survival status and reasons for exit, 
such as bankruptcy, mergers and court 
decisions. More than 38% of the sample 
firms were liquidated over the period 1999 
to 2013. We find that privatization and 
the choice of privatization option have no 
effect on the long-term survival of firms 
in Russia, but that managerial ownership 
lowers the likelihood of both liquidation 
and bankruptcy. Other transition-specific 
predictors of bankruptcy, such as the extent 
of price controls and the amount of wage 
arrears, affect firm exit in a significant way.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is a continuing interest in the effects of privatization, changes in ownership 
structure, and corporate governance of companies on their productivity and 
financial performance. This is particularly true of the transition countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and China, where privatization has encompassed almost all 
sectors of the economy and where ownership structures and corporate governance 
arrangements have changed radically in a relatively small period of time.
Almost twenty years have passed since the major privatization programs in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In Russia the vast majority of productive 
assets was privatized in the mass privatization program between 1992 and 1994. 
This study is dedicated to an important aspect of their long-run performance, 
namely their survival under rapidly changing conditions. In our analysis we 
focus on the question of whether privatization and ownership structure have 
affected businesses’ likelihood of liquidation and bankruptcy. 
We use a sample of 497 privatized and non-privatized firms that were founded 
in Russia under the Soviet planning system. These firms were surveyed in 
1999-2000. In addition, we observe whether these firms have been liquidated 
or bankruptcy proceedings initiated. The vast majority of liquidations are due 
to bankruptcy. We treat the relatively small number of mergers as active firms. 
Many of them have become subsidiaries of holding companies as a result of the 
restructuring of the electricity sector in 2008. We concentrate on liquidation 
and bankruptcy as outcomes for two reasons: first, they are important measures 
of firm performance, and we would like to estimate how they are affected by 
privatization; second, we would like to see whether privatization has played a role 
in accelerating the natural process of creative destruction in the transition from a 
planned to a market economy, in particular the removal of inefficient companies 
from the markets.
There might be objections to the view that bankruptcy and liquidation can be 
seen as a performance measure and that they have served to drive inefficient firms 
out of the market in Russia. First, from 1998 to 2002 the Russian bankruptcy 
law established a very low bankruptcy threshold and left debtors in a position 
where they could not effectively defend themselves from false accusations of non-
payment. There is anecdotal evidence that dishonest creditors used this legal 
situation to redistribute ownership rights, effectively through hostile takeovers 
(Simachev, 2003). However, in our sample 60% of bankruptcies were initiated 
in 2003 and later, after a new bankruptcy law was adopted that corrected this PRIVATIZATION AND SURVIVAL
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loophole. Second, we came across various cases in our sample where a firm’s 
assets were auctioned off during a bankruptcy procedure, only to be transferred 
to a new firm with the same name and location (often under a different legal form) 
that continued the same type of production. Still, we believe that bankruptcy 
and liquidation of an existing legal entity are fundamental disruptions of its 
business. Third, Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2007) argue that regional governors 
often captured the bankruptcy process with the help of loyal judges. They find 
that in regions with politically strong governors, bankruptcy procedures were 
introduced more frequently but led to liquidation in fewer cases. In our sample 
we observe only bankruptcies that eventually lead to liquidation, with the 
exception of 13 companies in which bankruptcy proceedings were underway at 
the point of data collection (beginning of 2013). Therefore, political biases should 
be mitigated in our sample, and we do not explicitly control for political variables 
in our regressions.
Our empirical approach is to test whether privatization, as well as ownership 
structure and other firm characteristics, have predictive power for the survival 
of firms. Our dependent variables will be indicators of liquidation or bankruptcy 
and the time that elapsed from the time of the survey until one of these events. 
Our explanatory variables of main interest are: whether a firm has been 
privatized, the chosen privatization option, the ownership stakes of various types 
of owners, and the concentration of ownership in the hands of outsiders (i.e., 
non-government shareholders that are not employed by the firm). We control for 
a number of standard bankruptcy predictors such as firm size, profitability, and 
leverage, and transition-specific variables such as the extent of price regulation 
and wage arrears, as well as location and industry affiliation. 
On the one hand, if privatization improves the productivity and financial 
performance of firms, as has been found in several studies (see section 2), we can 
expect it to also lower the likelihood of liquidation and bankruptcy. On the other 
hand, the government might protect firms under its control from bankruptcy, so 
the resulting effect is difficult to predict on theoretical grounds. Insider ownership 
(especially by managers) and the presence of large outside shareholders who 
monitor the management can mitigate agency problems and thus lead to better 
performance. However, there might also be entrenchment effects at work, which 
makes the question of the effect of insider and managerial ownership ambiguous 
a priori.
We find that privatization and the choice of privatization option have no effect 
on the long-term survival of firms in Russia. This is in line with earlier results 46
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by Brown et al. (2011), that any positive productivity effects of privatization in 
Russia take a long time to realize. But nor is it the case that privatization has 
considerably accelerated the process of creative destruction, which often takes 
the form of liquidation of existing firms.
Company insiders have typically received large ownership shares in the Russian 
privatization process, and at the date of the survey (1999/2000) they were still 
relatively high. We find that more than the size of the aggregate insider ownership 
stake it is the distribution of that stake among company insiders, i.e., managers 
and workers, that significantly affects the likelihood of being liquidated or going 
bankrupt. In particular, managers having a higher ownership stake reduces this 
likelihood, which could be explained by the presumably more concentrated 
ownership of managers and reduced agency costs, since their interests become 
more aligned with those of the firm (i.e., its shareholders).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a short literature review 
in section 2, we present our data, descriptive statistics on liquidation, bankruptcy, 
and privatization, as well as the variables used in the analysis in section 3. Section 
4 briefly discusses the econometric methods used in the paper. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Our study relates to at least three strands of the literature, namely the literature 
that studies the performance effects of privatization in the context of transition 
economies, the literature on the prediction of bankruptcy and corporate default, 
and the literature on the effect of ownership and corporate governance on default 
risk and firm exit more generally.
Two excellent surveys, Megginson (2005) and Estrin et al. (2009), summarize the 
literature on privatization and suggest that by and large the performance effects of 
privatization have been positive. However, the literature is not entirely conclusive 
about the performance effects. For example, Aussenegg and Jelic (2007) did not 
find significant changes in profitability, efficiency, output, and investments in a 
large sample of post-privatization firms from three Central European countries.
Hanousek et al. (2007), extending the methodology of Frydman et al. (1999), 
analyze the effects of different types and the concentration of ownership on 
performance using a large sample of firms in the Czech Republic after mass PRIVATIZATION AND SURVIVAL
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privatization. They find only limited effects of certain types of ownership, 
except for a positive effect of foreign ownership and ownership concentration for 
some performance indicators. Bai et al. (2009) study performance effects of the 
privatization of Chinese state-owned enterprises using a comprehensive panel 
data set. They find positive effects on labour productivity and profitability, which 
are sustained in the long run and more pronounced if the government reduces its 
stake to a minority position as opposed to keeping a majority stake.
Brown et al. (2011), in a follow-up study of Brown et al. (2006), find that the overall 
effect of privatization to domestic owners on firms’ productivity has been negative 
compared to other firms in the same industry in Russia. The estimation of time-
varying effects, however, shows that positive effects of privatization appear around 
the year 2003, i.e., about ten years after the mass privatization program. 
We draw our methodological framework from a series of studies of corporate 
bankruptcy and default. Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984) estimate static 
models of the probability of bankruptcy with mainly accounting ratios as 
explanatory variables. Altman’s z-score has become a particularly popular 
measure of financial distress. Shumway (2001) proposes a dynamic logit or hazard 
model with time-varying covariates and adds more equity market variables. 
Both the new variables and the improved estimation methodology increase the 
accuracy of the bankruptcy forecasts. Chava and Jarrow (2004) follow Shumway’s 
methodology and show that the inclusion of industry effects is important. In 
addition, they use data at monthly frequency, as opposed to yearly data as in the 
previous studies. Campbell et al. (2008) use the empirical measure of financial 
distress obtained from the dynamic logit model in order to infer the risk and 
return characteristics of stocks of financially distressed firms in the US. They 
show that the optimal model specification changes with the forecast horizon. 
Their explanatory variables based on accounting data are the ratio of net income 
to total assets, leverage (total liability as a ratio of total assets), cash holdings per 
total assets, market-to-book ratio, the firm’s price per share, and a measure of 
distance to default. Variables based on equity market data include the excess stock 
return over the S&P 500, volatility of stock returns, and market capitalization. 
Complementary to the finance literature, Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod 
(2008) summarize empirical methods and evidence on firm survival from an 
industrial organization perspective.
Few studies have been dedicated to the effect of ownership distribution on default 
or firm exit directly. Zeitun and Tian (2007) find for a sample of Jordanian firms 
that firms with high ownership concentration and more state ownership are less 48
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likely to default. Several papers study the relation between corporate governance 
and various measures of default risk, such as credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2006), corporate bond yields spreads (Cremers et al., 2007), and credit default 
swap spreads (Switzer and Wang, 2013). Goktan et al. (2009) find that firms where 
managers have higher ownership stakes are more likely to go private, less likely to 
be acquired by another company, and less likely to go bankrupt. 
Two papers have investigated firm survival in Russia. Rinaldi (2008) analyzes 
entry and exit in the footwear industry during the years 1992-2000 and finds that 
new entrants are not better in terms of their survival chances than incumbent 
firms. Iwasaki (2013) studies two rounds of a large survey of Russian industrial 
firms (not the same that we use). The author concentrates on the effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the survival of firms and finds that the 
quality of corporate governance institutions has a positive effect on the chances 
of survival. 
3.   DATA, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON SURVIVAL AND PRIVATIZATION,  
AND VARIABLES
The sample of firms in this study comes from a survey of Russian manufacturing 
firms conducted in the years 1999 and 2000, with retrospective information 
going back to the founding of the firm and privatization at the beginning of the 
1990s. Part of the initial sampling strategy was to rely on the careful procedures, 
including sophisticated regional stratification, of the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS). Firms were identified from the answers of 
respondents to a question about their employer. From all the manufacturing 
firms, employers were randomly chosen with a probability proportional to firm 
employment. As a result the sample is biased towards larger firms, just like the 
Russian economy, since an employee (and thus a respondent of the RLMS) is 
more likely to work for a large firm. The final sample of firms covers 32 subjects 
of the Russian Federation, and matches the overall distribution of Russian firms 
across sectors rather well. There is some overweight in the electricity and fuel 
sectors, which reflects the rather large size of the firms in these sectors.
The overall sample contains 530 manufacturing firms. Since most of our analysis 
is dedicated to the effects of privatization we exclude a small fraction of the 
sample, 33 firms that were founded after 1986. This leaves us with 497 firms that 
have their roots in the Soviet planned economy and could potentially have gone 
through the process of privatization.PRIVATIZATION AND SURVIVAL
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We complement the survey data with information about the current survival 
status of the firm (active or inactive, and, in the latter case, liquidation date) as 
of the end of the first quarter of 2013, the reasons for liquidation, and ownership 
structure (state-owned vs. private) at the end of year 2012 or previous to the 
liquidation date. The status information was obtained from the Bureau van Dijk 
Ruslana database for Russian enterprises. The survey provided a unique firm 
identifier (OKPO, Russian classifier of firms and organizations) that allowed us 
to identify 488 out of 497 firms. The status of firms that were classified as non-
active and had not provided financial accounts in recent years was then verified in 
the Interfax-Spark database and the unified enterprise registry (Russian acronym 
EGRYuL). The latter also contained the date of the initiation of bankruptcy 
procedures - specifically, the date of the appointment of a bankruptcy manager.1 
Ownership information, which allowed inferring the date of privatization of 
companies that remained state-owned at the date of the survey, comes from the 
Interfax-Spark database and quarterly filings of firms to the Federal Agency for 
Financial Markets.
Table 1 presents information on the status of the sample firms. 57.6% of the sample 
firms have remained active and another 2.5% had remained active but were 
undergoing the process of bankruptcy at the point of data collection (beginning 
of 2013). All the other firms were liquidated as legal entities between 2000 and 
2012. The most frequent reason for liquidation (27.1% of the sampled firms) was 
bankruptcy. In 7% of cases the reason for liquidation was accession to a holding 
company or a merger. Most of the cases of accession occurred as a result of the 
restructuring of the electricity sector in 2005-2008. Thus, we observe only a very 
low number of firms that exited through genuine corporate restructuring.
Table 1.  Survival status and reasons for market exit
Status Frequency Percentage
Active 281 57.58
Liquidated as a result of bankruptcy 132 27.05
Legal entity dissolved due to accession or merger 34 6.97
Liquidated due to other reasons 29 5.94
In the process of bankruptcy 12 2.48
Total 488 100.00
1  The enterprise registry was set up in 2002, and in several cases the appointment of the 
bankruptcy manager coincided with the first entry in the registry. In these cases, and if we 
could not detect the reason for liquidation from the registry, we consulted the Integrum 
database, which contains archives of Russian newspapers, in particular Rossiskaya Gazeta 
and the Bulletin of the Federal Agency for Insolvency and Financial Recovery, for news about 
courts’ arbitration decisions in bankruptcy cases.50
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Table 2 displays the number of liquidations and bankruptcy initiations for each 
year from 1995 to 2012. Liquidation and bankruptcy rates were computed as 
the fraction of firms that were liquidated or entered bankruptcy in a given year 
among all active firms at the beginning of that year. We observe that liquidation 
rates peaked in the year 2006. In that year more than 8% of still-existing sample 
firms were liquidated. Bankruptcy rates were highest during the years 2001-2005 
(between 3% and 5%). Surprisingly, we do not observe any strong effect of the 
recent financial crisis on bankruptcies or liquidation.
Table 2.  Number of liquidations and bankruptcies, and their rates by year
Year Liquidations Liquidation rate 
(%)
Initiations of 
bankruptcy
Bankruptcy rate 
(%)
1995 0 0.00 1 0.20
1996 0 0.00 2 0.41
1997 0 0.00 4 0.82
1998 0 0.00 4 0.83
1999 0 0.00 8 1.68
2000 1 0.20 13 2.77
2001 3 0.62 21 4.61
2002 8 1.65 13 2.99
2003 18 3.78 20 4.74
2004 18 3.93 13 3.23
2005 19 4.32 17 4.37
2006 34 8.08 2 0.54
2007 23 5.94 8 2.16
2008 19 5.22 1 0.28
2009 12 3.48 1 0.28
2010 8 2.40 5 1.39
2011 14 4.31 5 1.41
2012 5 1.61 2 0.57
2013 2 0.65 1 0.20
TOTAL 184 140
Note: The total number of cases is slightly lower than in Table 1 due to missing values for the 
liquidation and bankruptcy year. The liquidation and bankruptcy rates are computed as ratios 
of the surviving (non-bankrupt) firms starting from 488 in the first year, the number of total 
observations in Table 1.
Next, Table 3 presents the fraction of firms that have been privatized at various 
points in time. A firm is considered to be privatized when private owners control PRIVATIZATION AND SURVIVAL
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more than 50% of the firm’s shares. The vast majority of firms were privatized in 
the mass privatization program and through lease-buyouts prior to 1994. Only 
7.3% of the sample firms were privatized after that year, and 17.4% of the firms 
were still state-owned at the end of year 2012 or at the date of liquidation.
Table 3.  When Firms Were Privatized
Number of 
firms
Sample 
size Percentage
Privatized by 1994 349 446 78.3
Privatized by 1999 382 491 77.8
Privatized by 2012 (or before liquidation) 400 484 82.6
Privatized between 1995 and 1999 16 446 3.6
Privatized between 2000 and 2012 18 484 3.7
We get a first approximate answer to our question of how privatization affected 
firm survival by looking at a simple two-dimensional tabulation of two indicator 
variables, one for privatization up to the year 1999 and the other for liquidation 
or bankruptcy, presented in Table 4. 
Table 4.  Privatization, liquidation, and bankruptcy
Liquidation Bankruptcy
Privatization by 
1999/2000
No of 
firms
Sample 
size Percent No of 
firms
Sample 
size Percent
No 32 106 30.2 29 106 27.4
Yes 129 380 33.9 116 380 30.5
Total 161 486 33.1 145 486 29.8
We can observe that liquidations and bankruptcy were present to approximately 
the same extent among privatized and non-privatized firms. However, this might 
be the result of other effects such as industry affiliation, profitability, or leverage, 
such that only a multivariate analysis can answer the question about the effect of 
privatization on survival.
Along with the indicator of privatization by the time of the survey, we consider 
the ownership structure to be the most interesting explanatory variable. In 
particular, we include the stakes of various types of shareholders and a measure 
of ownership concentration. At the beginning of 1999, on average 76.2% of the 
firm shares were in the hands of private owners, 43.7% were owned by company 52
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insiders (managers and workers), and 12.4% were owned by managers alone. As 
a proxy for ownership concentration among outside shareholders we consider 
the holdings of blockholders (shareholders with an at least 5% ownership stake). 
The stake of all such blockholders is 22.6% and the stake of the three largest 
blockholders is 21.4% on average.
Our control variables include standard predictors of bankruptcy. These are 
the return on assets as a measure of profitability, leverage (measured as bank 
loans as a fraction of total assets), and firm size (the logarithm of the number of 
employees), all for the year 1998. We also have data on the amount of payables, 
expressed as a fraction of total assets. We add two variables that are specific to the 
context of Russia as a transition country. The first is the amount of wage arrears. 
In the 1990s it was a widespread for firms not to pay their workers for several 
months and to accumulate wage arrears. On average, our sample firms were 2.5 
monthly payrolls in arrears at the end of 1998. Another feature that might affect 
the survival of firms is direct state intervention, in the form of regulated prices. 
On average, 24% of the sample firms’ sales were subject to price controls at the 
end of 1998.
Finally, we include two dummy variables for the location of the firm, the first 
if the firm is located in either Moscow or St Petersburg (which takes value 1 in 
that case), and the second if the firm is located in the Asian part of Russia (the 
European part excluding the two capitals is the base group). We also control for 
industry by including eight industry dummies. A complete list of explanatory 
variables and their definitions is given in Table A1.
4. METHODS
We have two working definitions of a firm exit. The first is the formal liquidation 
of the firm, which includes liquidation as a consequence of bankruptcy, by 
court decision, or for other reasons. As mentioned above, we treat accessions 
and mergers as active firms. The second definition of an exit is the initiation of 
bankruptcy procedure. 
In our econometric analysis we use two types of model to estimate the quantitative 
effects of various determinants of firm survival. First, we use logit models with 
an indicator variable for exit. Second, we use the Cox proportional hazard 
model as the most popular model for survival analysis. It assumes proportional PRIVATIZATION AND SURVIVAL
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hazard ratios, i.e., the ratio of the risk of liquidation of two groups (for example, 
privatized and non-privatized) is constant over time. 
Firm exit may occur due to various reasons. In studies of listed firms, bankruptcy, 
corporate mergers, and going private (delisting) are considered and a competing 
risk model is used to estimate the factors driving each of these decisions jointly 
(He et al., 2010, Goktan et al., 2009). Most of our sample firms are not traded, but 
it would still be desirable to study bankruptcy and mergers jointly as alternative 
forms of firm exit. However, we have only a small number of mergers in our 
sample, so we concentrate on the drivers of a company’s liquidation in general, 
and of bankruptcy in particular.
5. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
We first present the results of logit models with an indicator for liquidation or 
bankruptcy as the dependent variable. The estimation results are displayed in 
Tables A2 and A3 of the appendix, for liquidation and bankruptcy respectively. 
Each table contains three model specifications. The first model includes the 
dummy variable of whether the firm was privatized, the second the stakes of 
three types of owners, and the third our measure of concentration of outside 
ownership, each time along with standard predictors of bankruptcy. The regional 
and industry indicators are not reported.
We find no significant effect of privatization per se on the likelihood of being 
liquidated or going bankrupt. In previous research with the same sample (Sprenger, 
2011) we found that firms with higher productivity and higher wages were more 
likely to be privatized. One would, therefore, expect privatized firms to survive 
longer, but this might be compensated for by some state-owned firms being 
protected from bankruptcy, so that we do not find any difference. Unfortunately, 
we do not have direct measures of protection such as subsidies, state guarantees, 
or preference in public procurement. We do observe, however, that firms with a 
higher fraction of sales subject to price controls as a form of regulation decrease 
the likelihood of liquidation and bankruptcy. Such firms, while not necessarily 
owned by the government, seem to enjoy certain protection, or simply have a less 
volatile stream of revenues.
The result that privatization has no effect on survival is in line with the finding 
of Brown et al. (2011), that the positive effects of privatization on productivity 
took a very long time to materialize in Russia. We also test the effect of various 54
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privatization methods on the likelihood of liquidation and bankruptcy. Since we 
do not find any significant effects they are not reported.
Next, we study various features of the ownership structure and their relation 
to the exit of companies. We distinguish the state from private shareholders. 
Among private owners we consider the stakes of insiders (managers and workers) 
vs. outsiders (domestic financial institutions, non-financial firms, and foreign 
owners). Finally, we focus on the stake of managers among company insiders. 
We find that managerial ownership is associated with a lower risk of liquidation 
and bankruptcy. This result seems logical from an agency perspective. The 
interests of managers with higher ownership stakes are more aligned with those 
of the firm (i.e., its shareholders) and they therefore exert more effort and engage 
less in value-destructing activities such as the diversion of firm assets. Such an 
effect is not present for the stake of insiders as a whole, which means that the 
ownership stake of workers has the opposite effect. The share of workers in the 
equity of privatized firms was initially high due to the design of the Russian mass 
privatization program and subsequently has fallen considerably (Sprenger, 2011). 
Ownership by workers has usually been dispersed among many, which explains 
why it does not have an incentive alignment effect, but rather leads to lower 
performance.
In addition we consider outside owners, either measured as the joint ownership 
stake of the largest three blockholders (reported here) or as the joint ownership 
stake of all blockholders (not reported). A blockholder is defined as a shareholder 
with an ownership stake of at least 5%. In both cases we do not observe a 
significant effect on the likelihood of liquidation or bankruptcy.
Several of the control variables from standard models of bankruptcy prediction 
have explanatory power. Larger firms are less likely to be liquidated, but size does 
not affect the likelihood of going into bankruptcy. Wage arrears are, as one might 
expect, a positive predictor of both liquidation and bankruptcy. Wage arrears 
might indicate that firms were already distressed at privatization, but only the 
adoption of a functioning bankruptcy law in 1998 led to a larger number of 
liquidations. Overdue payables are also a positive predictor of bankruptcy in 
2 out of 3 specifications. In contrast, standard bankruptcy predictors such as 
profitability and leverage are insignificant in our regressions. The reason might 
be that these variables are measured with error or that they are quite volatile, in 
particular around the Russian crisis of 1998, when they were measured in our 
study.PRIVATIZATION AND SURVIVAL
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We now turn to the results from the Cox proportional hazard models given 
in Tables A4 and A5 of the appendix. In these models we estimate the effects 
of explanatory variables on the time until liquidation or bankruptcy. Model 
specifications 1 to 3 are analogous to the ones in Tables A2 and A3 for logit 
models. What is informative is whether the coefficients are greater or smaller 
than one. A one-unit increase in an explanatory variable leads to an increase in 
the hazard ratio by the reported coefficient minus one.
Privatization and concentration of outside ownership do not affect the time 
until liquidation or bankruptcy, consistent with the previous results from logit 
models. However, there is no negative effect of managerial ownership in these 
specifications. As before, size affects liquidity negatively, and the negative effect 
of price controls and the positive effect of wage arrears are confirmed.
6. CONCLUSION
Our representative sample of the old sector of the Russian economy (i.e., firms 
founded under the planned economy) shows that more than 42% of the sample 
firms interviewed in 1999-2000 were liquidated as legal entities over the next 14 
years. Most of the liquidations were due to bankruptcy. We have investigated 
drivers of firm exit with particular focus on privatization and ownership structure. 
We find that privatization and the choice of privatization option have no effect 
on the long-term survival of firms in Russia. This is in line with earlier results by 
Brown et al. (2011) that any positive productivity effects of privatization in Russia 
take a long time to realize. But nor has privatization considerably accelerated the 
process of creative destruction, which often takes the form of the liquidation of 
existing firms. A further investigation of other outcomes such as productivity and 
financial performance may clarify whether both effects (productivity increase 
and creative destruction) have been at work at the same time, so that the net effect 
on survival is close to zero.
It turns out, however, that one feature of ownership structure, namely managerial 
ownership, is associated with a lower likelihood of liquidation and bankruptcy, 
even though this effect is not robust to the estimation using a proportional hazard 
model where the timing of liquidation and bankruptcy is taken into account as 
well. Even though profitability is not related to subsequent firm exit we found 
a rather strong indicator of liquidation and bankruptcy: those firms who piled 
up wage arrears had significantly lower chances of survival. So there are indeed 
indications that less efficient firms are removed from the market.56
Economic Annals, Volume LIX, No. 200 / January – March 2014
Some of our results might be influenced by the fact that all explanatory variables 
are measured for the year 1998 when there was a severe financial crisis in Russia. 
We plan to investigate whether the effects are robust to the use of variables for 
the pre-crisis year 1997. More generally, further research should also take into 
account the dynamic changes in ownership structure and performance over time 
and their joint effect on firm exit. 
REFERENCES
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23(4), pp. 589–609.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, D. W. C. & LaFond, R. (2006). The Effects of Corporate Governance on Firms’ 
Credit Ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(1-2), pp. 203-243.
Aussenegg, W. & Jelic, R. (2007). The Operating Performance of Newly Privatised Firms in Central 
European Transition Economies. European Financial Management, 13(5), pp. 853-879.
Bai, C., Lu, J. & Tao, Z. (2009). How Does Privatization Work in China? Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 37(3), pp. 453-470.
Brown, J. D. & Earle, J.S. (2006). The Productivity Effects of Privatization: Longitudinal Estimates 
from Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Journal of Political Economy, 114(1), pp. 61–99.
Brown, J. D., Earle, J.S. & Gehlbach,S. (2013). Privatization. In Michael Alexeev and Shlomo 
Weber (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy (pp. 161-187). Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Campbell, J. Y., Hilscher, J. & Szilagyi, J. (2008). In Search of Distress Risk. Journal of Finance, 
63(6), pp. 2899-2939.
Chava, S. & Jarrow, R.A. (2004). Bankruptcy prediction with industry effects. Review of Finance 
8(4), pp. 537–569.
Cremers, K. J. M., Nair, V. B. & Wie,C. (2007). Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices. Review 
of Financial Studies, 20 (5), pp. 1359-1388.
Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E. & Svejnar, J. (2009). The Effects of Privatization and 
Ownership in Transition Economies. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3), pp. 699-728.PRIVATIZATION AND SURVIVAL
57
Frydman, R., Gray, C., Hessel, M. & Rapaczynski, A. (1999). When Does Privatization Work? The 
Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 114(4), pp. 1153-1191.
Goktan, M. S., Kieschnick, R., & Moussawi, R. (2009). The Effects of Corporate Governance on the 
Likelihood of a Corporation Being Acquired, Going Private, or Going Bankrupt. Working Paper, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360456.
Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E. & Svejnar, J. (2007). Origin and Concentration – Corporate Ownership, 
Control and Performance in Firms after Privatization. Economics of Transition, 15(1), pp. 1-31.
Iwasaki, I. (2013). Global Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Firm Survival: The Russian 
Experience. Journal of Comparative Economics, 42(1), pp. 178-211.
Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., Sonin, K. & Zhuravskaya, E. (2007). Are Russian commercial courts 
biased? Evidence from a bankruptcy law transplant. Journal of Comparative Economics, 35(2), pp. 
254–277.
Manjón-Antolín, M. C. & Arauzo-Carod, J. (2008). Firm survival: methods and evidence. 
Empirica, 35(1), pp. 1-24.
Megginson, W. L. (2005). The Financial Economics of Privatisation, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Rinaldi, G. (2008). The disadvantage of entrants: did transition eliminate it? The case of the 
Russian footwear industry (1992-2000). Empirica, 35(1), pp. 105-128.
Simachev, Y. (2003).Institut nesostoyatel’nosti v Rossii: spros, osnovnye tendentsii i problemy 
razvitiya [The institution of insolvency in Russia: demand, main trends and problems of 
development], Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 4, pp. 62-82.
Shumway, T. (2001). Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard model. Journal of 
Business 74(1), pp. 101-124.
Sprenger, C. (2011). The choice of ownership structure: Evidence from Russian mass privatization. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 39(2), pp. 260–277.
Switzer, L. N. & Wang, J. (2013). Default risk and corporate governance in financial vs. non-
financial firms. Risk and Decision Analysis, 4(4), pp. 243-253.
Zeitun, R. & Tian, G. G. (2007). Does ownership affect a firm’s performance and default risk in 
Jordan? Corporate Governance, 7(1), pp. 66-82.
Zmijewski, M. E. (1984). Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial distress 
prediction models. Journal of Accounting Research, 22 (Supplement), pp. 59-82.
Received: April 20, 2014
Accepted: May 07, 2014 58
Economic Annals, Volume LIX, No. 200 / January – March 2014
APPENDIX
Table A1.  List of explanatory variables
Variable  Explanation
privatized Equals 1 if the firm was privatized at the date of the survey 
(1999-2000), 0 otherwise
priv_opt1 Equals 1 if the firm chose privatization option 1, 0 otherwise
priv_opt2 Equals 1 if the firm chose privatization option 2, 0 
otherwise
priv_opt3 Equals 1 if the firm chose lease-buyout as privatization 
option, 0 otherwise
priv_opt4 Equals 1 if the firm chose another privatization option, 0 
otherwise
privsh99
inssh99
mansh99
Share of private (non-state) owners at the beginning of 1999
Share of insider owners (managers and workers)
Share of managers
threebl99
lnemp98
roa_98
lev_98
PRICECONT98
wagearr_mon98
ovdu_p98
Share of the three largest outside non-state blockholders (A 
blockholder is a shareholder with a stake greater than 5%)
Natural logarithm of the number of employees 1998
Return on assets 1998 (profit before taxes divided by total 
assets at the end of the year)
Leverage 1998 (bank loans divided by total assets at the end 
of the year)
Share of sales subject to price controls 1998
Wage arrears in monthly wage funds 1998
Overdue payables as a fraction of total assets 1998
reg_cap Moscow/St. Petersburg
reg_asia Asian part of Russia
ind_met
ind_chem
Ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy 
Chemical industry
ind_macb Heavy and light machinery
ind_for
ind_cons
Forestry
Construction materials
ind_food
ind_ligt
Food industry
Light industry
ind_othr Other industries
The omitted regional dummy is for the European part of Russia (excluding 
Moscow and St. Petersburg). The omitted industry dummy is for Coal, Gas, Fuel, 
Oil Extraction, and Electricity.PRIVATIZATION AND SURVIVAL
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Table A2.  Estimation results for logit models. Dependent variable: Liquidation
(1) (2) (3)
Privatized99 0.007 (0.02)
privsh99 0.001 (0.17)
inssh99 0.003 (0.51)
mansh99 -0.022* (-1.89)
threebl99 0.000 (0.05)
lnemp98 -0.346*** (-2.94) -0.323*** (-2.60) -0.297*** (-2.65)
roa_98 -0.109 (-0.50) -0.049 (-0.23) -0.074 (-0.35)
lev_98 0.094 (0.28) 0.060 (0.17) 0.097 (0.29)
PRICECONT98 -0.014** (-2.48) -0.013** (-2.22) -0.013** (-2.43)
wagearr_mon98 0.147*** (3.35) 0.138*** (3.10) 0.143*** (3.31)
ovdu_p98 0.788 (1.25) 0.615 (0.94) 0.789 (1.28)
_cons (%) 1.916* (1.72) 1.792 (1.54) 1.527 (1.45)
N 230 219 230
Pseudo R2 (%) 16.19 17.79 14.81
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A3.  Estimation results for logit models. Dependent variable: Bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3)
Privatized99 -0.164 (-0.40)
privsh99 -0.003 (-0.49)
inssh99 0.011 (1.63)
mansh99 -0.031** (-2.35)
threebl99 0.000 (0.01)
lnemp98 -0.072 (-0.63) -0.049 (-0.40) -0.040 (-0.37)
roa_98 -0.833 (-1.45) -0.784 (-1.52) -0.662 (-1.43)
lev_98 -0.364 (-0.80) -0.282 (-0.70) -0.283 (-0.70)
PRICECONT98 -0.014** (-2.50) -0.013** (-2.14) -0.013** (-2.38)
wagearr_mon98 0.074* (1.84) 0.086** (1.99) 0.074* (1.85)
ovdu_p98 1.033* (1.67) 0.878 (1.34) 1.096* (1.80)
_cons 0.310 (0.29) 0.247 (0.22) -0.109 (-0.11)
N 230 219 230
Pseudo R2 (%) 14.45 17.91 13.21
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0160
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Table A4.    Estimation results for Cox proportional hazard models:  
Time until liquidation
(1) (2) (3)
Privatized 0.910 (-0.30)
privsh99 0.998 (-0.57)
inssh99 1.003 (0.71)
mansh99 0.991 (-1.08)
threebl99 0.998 (-0.46)
lnemp98 0.816** (-2.45) 0.851** (-2.05) 0.851** (-2.20)
roa_98 0.893 (-0.61) 0.941 (-0.37) 0.930 (-0.43)
lev_98 1.025 (0.10) 1.020 (0.08) 1.049 (0.19)
PRICECONT98 0.992** (-2.03) 0.993* (-1.72) 0.992* (-1.91)
wagearr_mon98 1.073*** (3.15) 1.073*** (3.03) 1.074*** (3.10)
ovdu_p98 1.330 (0.68) 1.188 (0.39) 1.404 (0.81)
N 226 216 226
Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios); z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A5.    Estimation results for Cox proportional hazard models:  
Time until bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3)
privatized 0.849 (-0.49)
privsh99 0.995 (-0.99)
inssh99 1.006 (1.17)
mansh99 0.989 (-1.18)
threebl99 0.997 (-0.60)
lnemp98 0.926 (-0.84) 0.967 (-0.38) 0.956 (-0.54)
roa_98 0.543 (-1.36) 0.608 (-1.34) 0.624 (-1.31)
lev_98 0.828 (-0.52) 0.908 (-0.31) 0.919 (-0.27)
PRICECONT98 0.991** (-2.15) 0.991* (-1.95) 0.991** (-2.04)
wagearr_mon98 1.056** (2.25) 1.058** (2.26) 1.057** (2.26)
ovdu_p98 1.446 (0.84) 1.269 (0.51) 1.496 (0.91)
N 228 217 228
Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios); z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01